A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision -and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels -likewise affects voters' turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence.
Introduction
The question why people participate in elections has triggered much debate among both political scientists and economists. Particularly explaining the level of turnout in most elections proves challenging. Theories based on a rational comparison of costs and benefits (inspired by Downs 1957) indeed predict largescale abstention on Election Day, since the probability of bringing about one's preferred outcome is in most cases extremely small. As this clearly goes against the empirical observation that many people do vote, various authors have introduced an additional benefit due to 'expressive utility' (Brennan and Lomasky 1993; Brennan and Hamlin 2000; Hillman 2010; Jennings and Hamlin 2011) to escape the 'paradox of voting' (Riker and Ordeshook 1968: p. 31 ).
Considerable progress has, however, been made in explaining voters' turnout decisions at the margin (Matsusaka 1995; Geys 2006a; Andersen et al. 2012) .
That is, a large number of factors have been identified as important in just tipping the balance between abstention and voting in an individual's decision-making process (for overviews, see Blais 2006; Geys 2006a,b) . A significant share of this literature focuses on how a jurisdiction's institutional setting affects voters' costbenefit calculation. Still, much of this 'institutional' literature concentrates on the effects of diverse voting systems (e.g., compulsory voting, registration systems, quorum rules, concurrent elections, computerized voting) using cross-country comparisons (e.g., Roseman and Stephenson 2005; Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 2010) . In this article, we instead analyze the impact of the institutional design of (local) public good provision.
To the best of our knowledge, only one previous study deals with a similar topic. Hajnal and Lewis (2003) show that outsourcing municipal tasks negatively affects 2 voter turnout because, so their argument goes, it induces a loss of political influence among local governments (which reduces voters' benefits of casting their ballots). We take a more general approach inspired by the literature on fiscal federalism and public finance, and evaluate the impact of the distribution of political and administrative competences for (local) public good provision. Even though such institutions have long been acknowledged to matter for the efficiency of public good provision (Tullock 1965; Olson 1969; Oates 1972; Brennan and Buchanan 1980) , its effect on voter turnout has not been analyzed. Yet, as we will argue in more detail below, different institutional frameworks for the provision of public goods influence voters' expected benefits of voting, and thus are likely to affect turnout decisions 'at the margin'.
We assess the ensuing theoretical predictions using German local elections as our empirical test case. Compared to cross-country studies, this local setting allows analyzing turnout variation in a more homogenous socio-cultural environment, such that we can concentrate on the institutional variation in which we are interested. Moreover, Germany provides an ideal setting for our purposes since governments at the LAU 1 level 1 have an almost identical range of public administrative tasks across the German nation, but show wide diversity in terms of local self-administration (i.e., who is elected to decide if, how and how much of a fixed set of public goods should be provided). Our main results suggest that -in line with theoretical predictions -centralized decisions over all types of public goods within the municipality depresses turnout in municipal elections, while a federal government structure (which ties political decision-making authority more closely to the geographic reach of different public goods) increases voter turnout.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical background, and brings forward our central research hypotheses.
Section 3 brings forward the empirical approach, while section 4 presents our main findings. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
In section 2.1, we build on the fiscal federalism literature to introduce three distinct institutional systems for (local) public good provision wherein the public goods involved have varying geographical reaches. While these are currently employed to differing extents in Germany (see below) as well as other countries, they can here best be viewed as three archetypes. In section 2.2, we discuss their effects on voter turnout using the standard Downsian framework. As mentioned, we thereby aim to derive hypotheses (summarized in section 2.3) explaining turnout decisions at the margin, rather than absolute levels of turnout. Olson's (1969) principle of fiscal equivalence holds that there should be "congruence between the geographical scopes of government actions and their financing" (Enderlein 2009: 3) . A similar idea is captured in Oates's (1972 Oates's ( , 1999 decentralization theorem, which argues that "the provision of public services should be located at the lowest level of government encompassing […] the relevant benefits and costs" (Oates 1999 (Oates : 1122 . A radical interpretation of these ideas would involve the implementation of different governments for nearly every public good, which is untenable due to the excessive costs of such a multitude of 4 administrations. Consequently, different institutional designs can be observed in reality for the provision of the same set of 'local' public goods (where the apostrophes indicate that the geographic reach of different local public goods may vary). 2 These institutional settings can be categorized in roughly three prototypes, which differ with respect to who is elected to decide if, how and how much local public goods should be provided.
Types of local public governance
The first type of government -which we refer to as 'centralized municipalities' -concentrates all competencies in public good provision at one central level of local government, such that the differing geographic reaches of various local public goods simply are ignored. That is, decisions on the amount of public good provision are taken and implemented by one encompassing municipal parliament, which is elected in one single election. We illustrate this on the left-hand side of indicate the boundary of public goods benefiting the entire municipal population (referred to as 'municipal' public goods). The thin grey lines represent the boundaries of more localized public goods whose benefits only accrue to one intra-municipal community (referred to as 'community' public goods). 3 These intra-municipal communities do not, however, have their own representative bodies to decide over community public goods. Hence, both community and municipality public goods are decided and administered under central control (reflected by the fact that both are colored in a common grey shade in Figure 1 ).
2 For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that there are two types of public goods: i) one where the costs/benefits are localized to a small subgroup within the municipality (e.g., child care centers, local parks) and ii) one where the costs/benefits cover the entire municipality (e.g., municipal roads). 3 In the German setting analyzed below, these communities often reflect previously independent municipalities that merged into one new (larger) municipality.
____________________
Figure 1 about here
The second type of government -which we refer to as 'federal municipalities' -comes closer to the ideal-type described under the decentralization theorem, and consists of two bodies of government: i.e., one with responsibility over community public goods, and one with responsibility over municipal public goods. This setting is depicted in the right-hand side of Figure 1 by the white and grey shades, respectively. Although the competencies within the municipality remain the same as before, the internal organization thereof is different. That is,
there are now two independently elected parliaments deciding upon the amount of community and municipality public goods, respectively. Citizens therefore also have two votes (which, in the German case, are cast on the same Election Day):
i.e., one to elect the members of the community council administering community public goods, and one to elect the members of the municipal parliament administering municipal public goods.
Finally, the center of Figure 1 depicts the intermediate situation of 'confederal municipalities'. These concentrate political authority over public good provision predominantly at the local level in the sense that each community within the municipality elects its own parliament, which is then -as in federal municipalities -solely responsible for community public goods (as indicated by the white areas in Figure 1 ). Unlike federal municipalities, however, there is no directly elected municipal government, but rather a joint administrative council with deputies sent by each community within the municipality, which decides consensually about municipal public goods. Hence, as for centralized municipalities, voters have only 6 one vote. This elects the community council directly, and affects indirectly the composition of the joint administrative council at the municipal level.
Effects on voter turnout
To evaluate the effect of such institutional differences in local public good provision, we start from classical rational voter theory (Downs 1957) , where the net benefit of voting (R) is:
In Eq. (1), B = U Y -U Z is the difference in expected utility from the policy alternatives proposed by parties Y and Z, respectively; 4 C is the cost of voting arising from, for example, gathering information and getting to the polling booth;
and ρ is the probability of being pivotal in favor of one's most desired policy.
Note that we hereby follow Matsusaka's (1995) interpretation of the meaning of ρ, rather than the slightly more restrictive Downsian version (i.e., ρ as the probability of being pivotal in the political decision-making process versus the probability of being pivotal in the election). While both interpretations are equivalent under majority rule (absent political agency effects), Matsusaka's (1995) interpretation is more appropriate under non-majoritarian systems characterized by coalitions, bargaining and/or logrolling since simply tipping the election might not be sufficient to bring about one's most desired policy (this will be particularly relevant in our empirical setting below).
Introducing institutional differences in public good provision in this framework, and evaluating how these affect individuals' turnout decisions at the margin (Matsusaka 1995; Geys 2006a; Andersen et al. 2012 ) requires some additional notation. First, utility can derive from community (U com ) or municipal public good consumption (U mun ), and each of two parties (Y and Z) promises to produce a certain amount of each of these goods (also subscripted by com and mun, respectively). Second, elections can be held within each community (among its n com voters) and/or within the municipality as a whole (among its n mun voters),
where the municipal electorate is the sum of all communities' sub-electorates (n mun = ⅀n com ). Finally, we assume that the individual costs of voting are independent of institutional design of local public good provision, and are identical across the municipal types.
Introducing these elements into Eq. (1) according to the institutional attributes of centralized municipalities leads to the following net benefit from voting in such municipalities:
Voters thus choose the party (Y or Z) offering the optimal bundle of community and municipality public goods. Since in this case there is only one election held at the municipal level, the probability of being decisive in favor of one's desired policy bundle is ρ mun .
Similarly, for federal municipalities, Eq. (1) becomes:
Voters are now able to cast separate votes for the community and municipality councils. Hence, a vote for a certain community policy (which is pivotal with probability ρ com ) is unconditional on, and thus additively separable from, the choice of a municipal policy (which is pivotal with probability ρ mun ).
Finally, for confederal municipalities, there is only one community-level election, in which a voter must choose the party (Y or Z) offering the optimal bundle of community and municipality public goods. One's vote is pivotal for the community policy choice (|U Y,com -U Z,com |) with probability ρ com . Moreover, through the selection of the members of the joint administrative council from the community councils (see above), a vote also influences municipal public good provision (|U Y,mun -U Z,mun |) with some probability that depends on the probability of being pivotal in the community election, i.e., ρ mun = f(ρ com )). Still, as each voter has only one vote and thus has to evaluate the overall benefit |(U Y,mun + U Y,com ) -(U Z,mun + U Z,com )| on Election Day, the probability of being pivotal for this overall benefit becomes a more complicated function of ρ com . Hence, Eq. (1) becomes:
Using Equations (2), (3), and (4), two important effects of the institutional design of public good provision can be distinguished for a given set of public policy offers by both parties. The first relates the benefit-term B, and second is related to the probability term ρ.
The benefit of voting (B)
Comparing Equations (2), (3), and (4), the benefit term in the voter's calculation is clearly the same in confederal and centralized municipalities. 
The probability of being pivotal (ρ)
A vote is decisive when it creates or breaks an exact tie in favor of one's preferred policy outcome (Matsusaka 1995) . Commonly, this is argued to be an inverse function of the electorate's size and a direct function of the election's closeness (Beck 1975; Owen and Grofman 1984; Hansen et al. 1987; Dhillon and Peralta 2002) . However, as mentioned, moving beyond a unitary system with majoritarian voting (i.e., the standard Downsian setting), this probability will also be affected by the precise institutional design.
Clearly, the three types of local public governance discussed in section 2.1 influence the number of eligible voters deciding upon public good provision at the community and municipality level. Specifically, in centralized municipalities, elections are held only at the level of the municipality. Hence, the number of voters is n mun . In both confederal and federal municipalities, elections either only or also take place at the community level, with n com voters. As by definition n mun >n com , the probability of casting a decisive vote is larger in the latter two systems compared to centralized municipalities. Moreover, in federal and confederal municipalities, voters can influence community-level policies directly and also can affect the bargaining power at the municipal level (via the municipal vote in federal municipalities and via one's community representation at the municipal level in confederal municipalities). This results in a great chance of being pivotal on overall public policy than in centralized municipalities. In other words, even for a given size of the electorate, a voter becomes more powerful in federal and confederal settings compared to a centralized setting. 5 The direct implication is that the probability of affecting the policy outcome is least in centralized municipalities.
Comparing the chances of being pivotal in federal and confederal municipalities is not straightforward as this depends on how ρ mun (under the federal system) relates to f(ρ com ) under the confederal system (see above). To the extent that, compared to federal municipalities, the effect of a smaller electorate in confederal municipalities is roughly compensated by the representative character of the joint administrative council, we have that:
Cen . It is important to point out, however, that the exact relative size of ρ Fed versus ρ
Con is innocuous for our key predictions as long as their magnitudes do not outweigh the difference in the benefits of voting (B) in both governance types (see below).
Hypotheses
To summarize, this discussion leads to the following hypotheses. First, based on our arguments regarding the effects of institutional design on both the benefit of voting (B Fed ≥ B Con = B Cen ) and the probability of influencing the election
Cen ), 6 we hypothesize that:
(H1a) Compared to confederal and centralized provision of local public goods, voter turnout is highest under federal provision.
(H1b) Compared to federal and confederal provision of local public goods, voter turnout is least under fully centralized provision.
The intuition underlying H1a is that federal municipalities allow voters to express a distinct preference for a certain set of preferred policies (possibly offered by two different parties), rather than have to choose a single party that may not implement their preferred policy for both public goods. This increases the benefit of voting (B). At the same time, voters' probability of being pivotal in bringing such optimal outcome about (ρ) is at least as large in federal municipalities as in the centralized and confederal systems. Similarly, the intuition for H1b is that voters' probability of being pivotal (ρ) are lowest in this system. Moreover, the benefit from voting (B) is at most as great as under the federal and confederal systems.
Empirical implementation

Empirical model and data
We evaluate the hypotheses formulated above using a large sample of German municipalities. Germany provides an ideal setting for such test since governments at the LAU 1 level have an almost identical range of public administrative tasks across the German nation, but differ in terms of local self-administration (conforming to the three governance types described above). Table 1 ).
____________________
7 For more details on Germany's federal system, municipal tasks and comparisons of municipal types, we refer the interested reader to Biehl (1994) , Zimmermann (1999) 
where ). First of all, we control for the size of the municipal electorate, as well as the average size of the community-level sub-electorates (including squared terms to account for possible non-linearities). Then, we capture the closeness of an election by computing the difference in the vote shares of the winner and the runner-up in the election. 9 This ex-post measurement of closeness 9 Although restricting ourselves to the relative size of the first two parties in our measure of closeness may be overly restrictive in our multi-party setting, measures explicitly aimed at incorporating the vote (or seat) shares of multiple parties such as the 'entropy'-measure proposed in Kirchgässner and Schimmelpfennig (1992) and Kirchgässner and Zu Himmern 14 is driven by the fact that ex-ante data are, unfortunately, not available, i.e., no polls exist at the municipal level and significant changes in the municipal structure prevent the use of historical election outcomes as proxies. We should note here that these controls for size and closeness imply that the municipalitytype dummies in our estimation pick up all institutional effects on both B and ρ (as defined in the theoretical section above) that exist in addition to these two elements. 10 To accommodate the idea that social pressures and interpersonal bonds are likely to vary between rural and urban areas (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Overbye 1995) , we include population density (defined as the number of inhabitants per as well since they generally depend on the number of parties included in its calculation (which clearly contaminates their measurement of size inequalities between the parties). As there is no commonly accepted solution to this problem, to the best of our knowledge, we gave preference to the relative simplicity of the two-party vote difference.
10 Since some federal states aggregate information on the vote share of non-partisan candidates in their official statistics, the share of such non-partisans can become quite large in our sample. To avoid this biasing our estimate of the election closeness effect, we enter a dummy variable equal to 1 when the share of non-partisan votes exceeds 33% of all votes.
11 In most previous work, population homogeneity is approximated by either racial/ethnic or income diversity. Unfortunately, we lack detailed information for both these indicators. Hence, we instead rely on age dispersion as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index:
where x i is the share of citizens in a specific age class (age: <3, 3-6, 6-10, 10-15, 15-18, 18-20, 20-25, 25-30, …, 65-75, >75) .
Given the generally accepted importance of income and education on voter turnout (Verba and Nie 1972; Pelkonen 2012) , we include the share of educationally highly-qualified (defined as the share of population with university degree) and low-qualified inhabitants (defined as the share of population without vocational training and without secondary school education) as well as the share of long-and short-term unemployed people in our model. We also include dummies equal to 1 when the local election takes place alongside EU or statelevel elections to control for the fact that concurrent (higher-level) elections tend to boost voter turnout (Geys 2006b 
Econometric issues
As our dependent variable (i.e., turnout) is by definition bounded between zero and one, we require an estimation method that is able to deal with fractional response variables. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is inappropriate since it implicitly ignores the bounded nature of the dependent variable and assumes a constant effect for all explanatory variables on turnout over its entire range.
Moreover, the predicted values from OLS regression cannot be guaranteed to lie within the 0-1 interval (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) . Although frequently employed, Tobit or logit models also do not solve the specific problems of fractional dependent variables satisfactorily. Applying a two-limit Tobit ensures that the predicted values lie within the unit interval, but this is true by definition and not caused by censoring (Kieschnick and McCullough 2003) . A logit transformation makes it difficult to recover the dependent variable from the original conditional mean function, which is the main point of interest in our study (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) .
Given that we have no observations on the boundary values of zero and one (see Table 2 ), two main approaches for estimating Eq. (5) can be considered. The first involves estimating the conditional mean function by maximum likelihood assuming a beta-distribution. The latter approach is consistent, asymptotically normally distributed and fully efficient if the assumed conditional density is correctly specified. Most researchers use a mean-dispersion parameterization of the beta-density suggested by Paolino (2001) and Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) to simplify the interpretation of the parameter estimates. In this specification, a functional form is modelled separately for the mean and the dispersion. The beta density can then be parameterized as: 
where Γ(.) is the gamma function, 0 < Turnout i < 1, 0 < µ i < 1 and φ > 1. The mean of the dependent variable now can be modelled using different link functions, which ensure that its expected value is bounded by 0 and 1. Using the logit link function, we obtain:
where z i stands for a matrix of all explanatory variables in Eq. (5), including the dummy variables, and π subsumes the corresponding parameter vector. As mentioned earlier, the critical drawback of this approach is that it yields inconsistent parameter estimates when the conditional density of the dependent variable is incorrectly specified. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) therefore suggest a quasi-parametric regression model, which assumes only that:
The known non-linear function G(.) satisfies 0 ≤ G(.) ≤ 1. For our analysis, we follow previous research and choose G(.) to be the logistic function. Particularly, we employ the quasi-maximum likelihood method based on the Bernoulli loglikelihood function proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) , which is consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the true distribution of Turnout i on z i , given that E(Turnout i | z i ) is correctly specified. This quasiparametric approach does not rely on the specification of the full distribution of
12 We carried out both estimation procedures, but focus on the quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) results below. The reason is that some evidence suggests that even if the beta assumption is valid, the maximum likelihood approach outperforms the QMLE estimator only in certain circumstances (Ramalho et al. 2011) . Moreover, to verify that our results are not driven by this particular choice of econometric method, we also performed a further robustness check building on a traditional OLS estimation with a logit-transformed dependent variable (i.e., log(turnout/(1-tunrout))) and Huber-White corrected standard errors. The results remained almost identical (details available upon request).
Results
Our central results using QMLE are presented in Table 3 (though similar results were achieved using the beta-regression model, available upon request) and indicate the high explanatory power of the model (R 2 = 0.672). Starting with our central institutional variables, we first of all find that a joint test on the parameters ϕ Cen and ϕ Fed confirms their joint significance (p<0.0001). This provides evidence that the institutional design of local public good provision has a strong influence on voter turnout. Moreover, in line with our theoretical expectations, we find that voter turnout is highest in federal municipalities (see hypothesis H1a) and lowest in centralized municipalities (see hypothesis H1b). Particularly, keeping all other explanatory variables fixed, a shift of the institutional setting from confederal (the reference group) to federal, would increase voter turnout by about 2.5% on average. These results support the idea that voters in federal municipalities perceive a larger net benefit of voting, which is driven by the fact that they can express a distinct preference for a set of policies (rather than a party) and have a higher probability of bringing such optimal outcome about. Similarly, all else remaining constant, a shift of the institutional setting from confederal to centralized, would decrease voter turnout by about 1.9 % on average. This is due to voters' relatively small probabilities of being pivotal in favor of a desired policy, which reduces their incentive to vote at the margin.
____________________ Table 3 
Conclusion
Building on the fiscal federalism and public choice literatures, this article provided a first look into the relation between the institutional design of (local) public good provision and voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that different institutional designs for public good provision affect voters' turnout calculus at the margin by affecting the net benefit of voting on Election Day. The ensuing hypotheses were tested using a dataset on local-level elections in Germany, where a substantial variety of institutional designs can be observed in the provision of the same broad set of local public goods.
Our inquiry provided two key results. First, and most generally, we found supporting evidence for the hypothesis that institutions beyond those concerning the design of elections (such as compulsory voting, registration system, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting, quorum rules, concurrent elections) can have an effect on voter turnout. Second, we illustrate that (de-)centralization of (local) public good provision drives voters' turnout decisions at the margin in line with predictions derived from a simple rational-choice Downsian framework. Voter turnout is lowest in fully centralized municipalities and highest in federal municipalities -compared to the reference group of confederal municipalities.
Allowing voters to express more detailed preferences regarding local public goods depending on the geographic reach of these public goods thus increases turnout.
Within the Downsian framework adhered to in our theoretical discussion, decentralization increases voter turnout by increasing the perceived net benefit of casting a ballot in favor of one's preferred policy bundle. Interestingly, a similar prediction can also be derived from an expressive voter perspective. One could indeed argue that expressive utility is highest in federal municipalities -compared to confederal and centralized municipalities -because two votes allow one to express more options (and thus gain more expressive utility) than does one vote.
Still, the observed difference in turnout between confederal and centralized municipalities would appear harder to explain from such an expressive perspective -whereas it is compatible with the instrumental model.
Overall, our findings support the classical idea -incorporated in the principles of fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969 ) and the decentralization theorem (Oates 1972 (Oates , 1999 ) -that there should be a close relationship between the geographic reach of public goods and the decision authority responsible for their provision. Assigning responsibility to the 'right' level of government appears not to have positive effects only on the efficiency of public good provision (Olson 1969; Oates 1972 Oates , 1999 , but also on voter turnout. 
